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ASSET SECURITIZATION:                        
IS IT A RESOLUTION OPTION FOR 
CHINA’S NON-PERFORMING LOANS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s banking industry has been straddled with a stagger-
ing number of non-performing loans (“NPLs”).1  These bad loans 
were extended by China’s state banks to inefficient state-owned 
enterprises (“SOEs”), as well as failed real estate projects dur-
ing the time of economic overheating in the mid 1990s.2  In or-
der to overhaul its fragile banking system, the Chinese govern-
ment has taken a series of measures over the past decade to 
clean up the balance sheets of four major state banks.3  One 
significant step was the creation of four Asset Management 
Companies (“AMCs”) in 1999, which purchased at face value 
about USD170 billion of NPLs from four major state banks with 
the ultimate task of disposing of these assets.4  To date, the 
AMCs have recovered about a quarter of the transferred portfo-
lio through various techniques including loan resale, public auc-
tion, debt restructuring, and debt to equity swaps.5  Recently, 
with governmental support, the Chinese AMCs have also begun 
  
 1. The official NPL ratio at four major Chinese state banks was given in 
1999 as 25% of the total loans outstanding.  For several years, the government 
denied the scale of the problem and dismissed unofficial estimates that put 
the ratio at 40% or more of the total loans outstanding.   See infra notes 35–39 
and accompanying text.  Nicholas Lardy, a China expert at the Brookings 
Institution, however, recently estimated China’s NPLs to be USD500 billion, 
or about 50% of the total.  Casino Capital: China’s Financial Markets Are 
Wild and Often Less Than Wonderful, in THE WEAKEST LINK: A SURVEY OF 
ASIAN FINANCE  10, 12 (supplement to ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003) [hereinafter 
Casino Capital]. 
 2. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.  
 3. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 12. 
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to explore asset securitization as an alternative for the expedi-
tious and efficient resolution of NPLs under their charge.6 
Asset securitization7 refers to a specific form of financial 
transaction in which an originator pools certain types of illiquid 
assets (typically loans or receivables) and transfers them to a 
special purpose vehicle (“SPV”).8  The SPV, in turn, issues secu-
rities (usually bonds, but can also be equities) collateralized or 
backed by the transferred assets.9  The SPV pays investors of 
these asset backed securities (“ABSs”) interest and principal out 
of the cash flow arising from the underlying assets.10  Investors 
then purchase the securities based on their evaluation of the 
transferred assets’ risk, without concern with the originator’s 
financial condition.11 
Securitization is beneficial to originators through risk trans-
ferring.  For corporations, securitization offers a new and poten-
tially cheaper form of financing.12  For financial institutions, 
such as banks that hold large loan portfolio, securitization not 
only provides alternative financing, but also allows them to ad-
dress regulatory requirements, such as capital adequacy and 
lending limits.13  Therefore, a financial institution originator 
may achieve a good match between assets and liabilities.14  
  
 6. Interview with Kaisheng Yang, Chairman, China Huarong Asset Man-
agement Corporation, in Beijing, China (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Interview 
with Yang].   
 7. In this Note, asset securitization and securitization are used inter-
changeably.  For a general discussion on securitization, see TAMAR FRANKEL, 
SECURITIZATIONS : STRUCTURED FI NANCING , FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1999); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE : A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE]; THE SECURITIZATION OF 
FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999); Chris-
topher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 
TULANE L. REV. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweet-
ener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); and Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Schwarcz, Alchemy]. 
 8. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–3.  
 9. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 7, at 135.   
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. IAN H. GIDDY , ASSET SECURITIZATION IN ASIA 2 (2000), available at  
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/absasia.pdf. 
 13. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banks that 
securitize assets are able to accomplish several objectives: (1) reduce regula-
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For investors, ABSs provide better yields than those on com-
parable corporate bonds and enable them to diversify their in-
vestment portfolios.15  In addition, the investors’ risk prefer-
ences may be accommodated through special deal structures.16  
Finally, since the ABS issues usually are large and have high 
credit ratings as a result of credit enhancements, these securi-
ties tend to be liquid and may be actively traded in secondary 
markets.17 
In a typical asset securitization transaction, the SPV issues 
securities backed by “good” assets with a proven track record of 
repayment streams.18  During the period of 1989 to 1995, how-
ever, the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”), a special 
agency sponsored by the United States (“U.S.”) government, 
successfully utilized the asset securitization to dispose of under- 
and non-performing loans taken over from failed savings and 
loan associations.19  The U.S. experience has since inspired 
some Asian economies, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, to 
employ securitization as a method to dispose of their bad bank 
loans.20  
This Note argues that given the magnitude and urgency of 
China’s NPL problem, the AMCs should explore all possible 
resolution methods, including securitization, to prevent their 
portfolios from rapidly decreasing in value like a melting ice 
cream.21  The Chinese AMCs, however, may only be able to util-
ize asset securitization to recover certain suitable NPLs, be-
cause there exist substantial obstacles to a large scale NPL se-
  
tory capital requirements; (2) obtain an additional source of funding, generally 
at lower cost; (3) enhance financial ratios; (4) manage portfolio risk; (5) diver-
sify their portfolios.  See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: ASSET SECURITIZATION 1 (2001), available at http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca06.pdf.  
 14. GIDDY, supra note 12, at 2.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 3–4. 
 17. Id. at 3. 
 18. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–2; see also 
GIDDY, supra note 12, at 3. 
 19. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.  
 20. See discussion infra Part V. 
 21. Kaisheng Yang called the value decrease of NPL portfolio as ”ice cream 
effect:” the bad loans are like “an ice cream you are holding in your hand, 
which, if you hold it too long, will melt away.”  Interview with Yang, supra 
note 6.   
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curitization program in China.  The most prominent hindrances 
include the peculiar nature of Chinese NPLs, the immaturity of 
the capital markets, and the inadequacy of China’s existing le-
gal infrastructure.   
Part II of this Note provides an overview of China’s banking 
system and NPL problem.  Part III then introduces the general 
features of asset securitization along with a cost-benefit analy-
sis.  Part IV examines the desirability and feasibility of dis-
tressed loan securitization, followed by a case study of the RTC 
securitization program.  Part V discusses the securitization de-
velopment in East Asia with some details on the Japanese and 
Korean cases.  Part VI considers the market conditions for NPL 
securitization in China, identifying as securitizable certain 
types of NPLs held by the Chinese AMCs.  Part VII examines 
China’s current legal and regulatory framework relevant to se-
curitization, and proposes for special legislation to facilitate 
securitization development.  Part VIII concludes by stressing 
that China must further liberalize its capital markets and es-
tablish a transparent legal system in order to pave the way for 
launching NPL securitization market.   
II. CHINA’S NON-PERFORMING BANKING LOANS 
This Part first provides an overview of China’s banking sys-
tem.  It then discusses the seriousness of the NPL problem, as 
well as its negative impact on the country’s financial stability 
and economic growth.  This Part ends with a review of the Chi-
nese government’s step to attack the NPL problem. 
A. Evolution of China’s Banking Industry 
China’s banking sector saw considerable institutional trans-
formation in the last two decades of the twentieth century.22   
For a long time, China lacked a sophisticated banking system.  
Until the early 1980s, the People’s Bank of China (“PBoC”) per-
formed the mixed functions of both a central and an operational 
bank.  In 1984, the PBoC’s operational business, consisting 
mainly of short-term industrial and commercial credit as well 
as related payments (i.e., granting loans for working capital), 
  
 22. For a comprehensive discussion on the evolution of China’s banking 
system, see NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA ’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION ch. 3  
(1998). 
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were assigned to a newly established state bank, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”).  Accordingly, PBoC 
started to perform solely the functions of the nation’s central 
bank. 23  ICBC, along with the Agricultural Bank of China 
(“ABC”), China Construction Bank (“CCB”), and the Bank of 
China (“BOC”), operated through the late 1980s and 1990s as 
the four major so called “specialized” state banks (hereinafter 
“the big four”), dominating the country’s financial landscape. 24 
During the 1990s, the Chinese government accelerated the 
process of the banking system reform.  The Central Banking 
Law enacted in 1995 formally granted the PBoC the legal au-
thority to function as a central bank.  Today, the PBoC holds 
the role as the lead supervisor of China’s financial institu-
tions.25  In addition, since 1994, the government began to trans-
form the big four into commercial entities.  At the same time, 
the prior division of their business scope along the client sector 
line gradually diminished, allowing more competition among 
the big four.  Beginning in the mid 1980s, the government re-
laxed restrictions on the banking market entry, granting li-
censes to a number of new commercial banks and nonbank fi-
nancial institutions.  Foreign banks were also permitted to es-
tablish their operations in China, but were subject to severe 
restriction on both geographic and sectoral scope of domestic 
currency business.26  Up to the year 2000, only 32 licenses were 
granted to foreign banks to handle such business, all of which 
are in Shanghai and Shenzhen.27  An even smaller group of 
them is allowed to borrow from and lend to local banks.  When 
  
 23. Id. at 63–62. 
 24. Id. at 80. 
 25. A complex web of government authorities oversees the country’s bank-
ing activities.  The regulatory framework can be generally broken down 
among the PBoC, the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”), the State Administration of Foreign Ex-
change (“SAFE”), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(“MOFTEC”) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (“SETC”).  Each 
regulator, however, has individual preferences and objectives in its regulatory 
duties.  ERNST &YOUNG , AN OVERVIEW OF THE NON-PERFORMING ASSET MARKET 
IN THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 10 (2001) (on file with the author) [here-
inafter ERNST & YOUNG REPORT]. 
 26. Karen Chan, Development in Banking Law 2000: Global Banking — 
Asia/Pacific, 20 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 32, 42–43 [hereinafter Asian Banking 
2000 Review]. 
 27. Id. at 43. 
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China acceded to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in the 
end of 2001, it committed itself to opening up its financial sector 
to the outside world.  Accordingly, after a five-year transitional 
period, the Chinese government will eliminate both geographic 
and customer limitations on foreign banks in conducting the 
local currency business, and foreign banks will eventually enjoy 
national treatment.28 
Although the institutional landscape has become more com-
plex,29 the Chinese banking sector remains underdeveloped, 
even when compared to other Asian markets.  The banking sec-
tor’s main clientele is the state sector.  For example, state 
banks extend most loans (about 80%) to state-owned enter-
prises, while the private sector receives less than 5% of total 
lending.30  The services to their customers are limited to basic 
deposit, lending, and transaction banking.31  Household deposi-
tors receive few financial services beyond maintaining their 
savings accounts.  In fact, basic retail banking services, such as 
checking accounts for households, are rare, even in the largest 
cities.  Credit cards, home mortgages, and car loans are still in 
their infancy stage.  Meanwhile, other types of consumer credit 
still do not exist.32 
B.The NPL Problem 
China’s effort to modernize its banking system has been bur-
dened by mountains of bad loans sitting on the books of major 
state banks.33  Chinese scholars estimate that the proportion of 
  
 28. Id. 
 29. Currently, the structure of China’s banking system consists of 4 state 
commercial banks, 3 policy banks, 10 national joint-stock commercial banks, 4 
asset management corporations, about 88 city-based commercial banks, 3,240 
urban credit cooperatives, more than 41,500 rural credit cooperatives, and 
approximately 162 foreign banks that maintained branches or representative 
offices. ERNST & YOUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 8.  
 30. The Long March to Reform China’s State Firms, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 8143861. 
 31. Stephen M. Harner, China Watch: Beijing Blocks the Banks, ASIAN 
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at J10, available at 2000 WL 23745833. 
 32. LARDY, supra note 22, at 82–83.  
 33. For a thorough discussion of China’s NPL problem, see Jianbo Lou, 
China’s Bank Non-Performing Loan Problem: Seriousness and Causes, 34 
INT’L LAW. 1147 (2000). 
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NPLs34 to overall bank assets has ranged from 10–40%.35  In 
1999, the governor of PBoC, Dai Xianglong, officially recognized 
that the ratio of NPLs to total outstanding loans at the big four 
was 25%.36  The Bank for International Settlements, in a 2002 
report, estimated the NPLs accumulated by China’s big four to 
be 42% of the total.37  This figure is comparable to the highest 
levels of 40% to 60% for South Korea and Indonesia during the 
height of the 1997-98 financial crisis.38 In 2001, Standard & 
Poor’s (“S&P”), a credit rating agency, estimated that it would 
take about USD540 billion, half of China’s annual GDP, to 
properly recapitalize the big four.39 
Although an in-depth discussion of the causes of China’s NPL 
problem is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief summary is 
helpful.  Historically, the NPL problem roots from the prior re-
gime of command economy.  For decades during the pre-reform 
era, state banks served as mere conduits for the quasi-fiscal 
operations of government institutions, extending easy credit to 
loss-making SOEs, providing subsidy loans for agricultural pro-
curement programs, and financing a variety of public invest-
ment projects according to the needs of state planning.40   
Banking reform did not prevent NPLs from snowballing.  
While struggling to establish themselves as truly autonomous 
entities, the state banks were only to find the impossibility of 
  
 34. The identification of NPLs referred to here is made under China’s old 
three tier loan classification system. The total figure of NPLs includes loans 
that were overdue for less than one year and might be recovered.  The main 
body of the portfolio, however, consists of doubtful and bad loans that would 
have to be written off.  Since 1998, a new five level system, more in line with 
the international standard, has started to be implemented in the industry.  
See id. at 1192 n.4.   
 35. Id. at 1147. 
 36. See id.  See also Peter Montagnon and James Harding, Chinese Cen-
tral-Bank Governor To Reduce Bad Debt, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1999, available 
at 1999 WL 21147750. 
 37. GUONAN MA & BEN S.C. FUNG, CHINA’S ASSET MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATIONS 2 (Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No. 115, 
Aug. 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work115.pdf [hereinafter BIS  
WORKING PAPER}. 
 38. Id.  See also, Review and Outlook: the Care and Feeding of China’s 
Banks, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at A11, available at 2002 WL 
23018599 [hereinafter Review and Outlook].   
 39. Id. 
 40. Fred Hu, Sense of Urgency, A Race Against Time, ASIAN WALL ST., Feb. 
11, 2002, at J8, available at 2002 WL 3344150 [hereinafter Sense of Urgency].   
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allocating credit purely based on commercial considerations.41  
They continue to face strong, although perhaps less outright, 42 
political pressure to rescue the financially deteriorating SOEs.43  
Furthermore, the banks’ problem of lax internal credit risk con-
trol persists,44 even though most banks have begun to pay more 
attention to the borrowers’ repayment capability and loan col-
lateral’s quality.  The lack of effective internal control and ex-
ternal oversight, coupled with the difficulty of obtaining reliable 
financial information on the SOE borrowers, seriously con-
strained the ability of state banks to prudently assess credit 
risk, resulting in the declining of their loan quality.45   
In addition to the soft loans made to the loss producing state 
owned factories, NPLs also include failed commercial real es-
tate loans.  In the mid 1990s, a time of economic overheating, 
many Chinese banks lent excessively to commercial real estate 
development projects, mainly in Shanghai, Beijing and some 
other coastal cities.46 A considerable portion of such loans be-
came nonperforming when the overbuilding resulted in a mar-
ket collapse. 47  
The NPL problem has a serious negative impact upon both 
China’s banking reform and its overall economic growth.  First, 
the mounting NPL portfolios on the big four’s balance sheets 
stand as a formidable obstacle to their true commercialization.  
The huge amount of bad loans in fact contributed to the big 
four’s profitability decline, undermining their competitiveness. 
48  Significantly, the staggering figure of NPLs has already 
  
 41. Id. 
 42. In 1998, the PBoC terminated the long-standing credit ceiling system. 
See Dai Xianglong, Wei Jianli Xiandai Jinrong Tixi, Jinrong Zhidu he Liang-
hao de Jinrong Chixu er Nuli [The Objectives of a New Round of Financial 
Reform and Development], 2 ZHONGGUO JINRONG [CHINA FIN.] 6 (1998). 
 43. See Sense of Urgency, supra note 40 (pointing out that the fundamental 
cause of the NPL problem lies in the deteriorating performance and loss mak-
ing of many SOEs, the state banks’ main clientele).  See generally LARDY, su-
pra note 22, Ch. 2.   
 44. Sense of Urgency, supra note 40.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See LARDY, supra note 22, at 195–97. 
 47. See id. 
 48. The average profit margin of the big four during the period from 1995 
to 1997 was only 0.26% and showed a decreasing tendency.  In contrast, the 
profitability of the ten new commercial banks during the same period was 
1.70% and showed an increasing tendency.  One of the reasons that these 
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made the big four technically insolvent.49  Liquidity, however, is 
currently not a problem facing China’s state banks.  Two rea-
sons explain this coexistence of technical insolvency and high 
liquidity in the banking sector: (1) high domestic household sav-
ings,50 and (2) limited investment outlets in the underdeveloped 
domestic capital markets.51  The big four are kept afloat mainly 
on governmental support and the public’s confidence in state 
banks.52  Given the weight the big four carry in the entire bank-
ing system,53 any wavering of public depositors’ faith could 
cause a major bank failure, and the resultant systemic financial 
debacle would lead China into turmoil.54   
The NPL problem also stymies China’s real economy.  On the 
microeconomic level, the accumulation of NPLs on banks’ bal-
ance sheet distorts the incentives for both banks and SOEs.  
The so-called “adverse selection” influencing banking lending 
decisions55 fostered the SOEs’ excessive reliance on state banks, 
diminishing their willingness and capability to adjust produc-
tion in response to market signals.56  From a macroeconomics 
  
newcomers outperformed the big four is that they had a very low NPL level.  
It is estimated that the emerging commercial banks have NPLs accounting for 
only 2.3% of their outstanding loans.  See Lou, supra note 33, at 1148, nn.14–
15. 
 49. See LARDY, supra note 22, at 119.   
 50. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1159–62.  In 1997, bank deposits and sav-
ings accounted for more than 80% of all household financial assets, securities 
only accounted for approximately 10%, and cash and other assets less than 
10%.  See Statistics Department of the PBoC, An Analysis of the Direct Fi-
nance of Chinese Enterprises, 9 CHINA FIN. (Beijing) 24 (1998). 
 51. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1159–62. 
 52. Commentators have observed that China’s low national debt, high sav-
ings rate, and reform momentum have so far forestalled a disastrous crisis of 
confidence in the banking system.  See, e.g., Hugo Restall, Examining Asia: 
Selling Debt, Restarting Reform, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2001, at J11, 
available at 2001 WL 29659268.  
 53. As of 1998, the big four held 68% of the nation’s deposits, 77% of all 
loans, and 75% of total banking assets, and employed 66% of those working in 
the banking sector.  See Lou, supra note 33, at n.23.  
 54. See LARDY, supra note 22, at 201–02.   
 55. See Lou, supra note 33 at 1151–52 
 56. The “adverse selection” refers to the distortion in the process of loan 
decision making.  Because of the heavy exposure of state banks to SOE bor-
rowers and the large amount of NPLs in proportion to the bank capital, the 
bank managers, in fear of the banks’ own failure, were forced to extend new 
workout loans to the ailing SOEs enabling them to service the existing out-
standing debts.  The managers of highly leveraged SOEs, on the other hand, 
 
File: CAO Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on:  3/24/2003 7:12 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:27 AM 
574 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
perspective, the soundness of China’s financial sector has a ma-
jor influence on the health of the overall economy. 57  China has 
a bank-centric financial system, where banks play a key role of 
channeling funds from households to industry and commerce.  
The banks’ share of financial intermediation is almost nine-
tenths, a ratio exceeding that of almost all other Asian econo-
mies.58 Any contraction of bank credit therefore could signifi-
cantly affect China’s real economic growth.  Some economists, 
for example, believe that the 1998 economic slowdown in China 
was partially due to the banking sector stress caused by the 
cautiousness of banks in their lending in response to the alarm 
of the Asian financial crisis.59  
C. Steps to Resolve the NPL Problem 
In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government began taking 
steps aimed at reversing the deterioration of state banks loan 
assets.  It recognized that one reason for the existence of nonre-
coverable loans was government pressure on state banks to 
make loans to politically important SOEs without giving regard 
to their repayment capability.  As a result, the government set 
up three policy banks in 1994 to take over the pure policy lend-
ing function from the big four.60  The government hoped that 
after creating these new policy banks, the big four would be run 
along more commercial lines.  Subsequently, the 1997–1998 
financial crisis that afflicted many of China’s East Asian 
neighbors awakened the Chinese leaders to the dangers that a 
fragile banking sector could pose to the country’s financial secu-
rity and economic development.61  Although China averted a 
crisis largely due to its financial insulation,62 the government 
realized the urgent need to take sweeping measures in order to 
avert a systemic financial debacle.  A significant step was taken 
  
had no incentive to scrutinize their projects or to promote the firms’ profitabil-
ity, because they knew that banks have no choice but to keep lending.  Id.   
 57. Id. at n.33 (citing literature discussing a significant correlation be-
tween financial development and growth in China and other countries). 
 58. See LARDY, supra note 22, at 16. 
 59. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1153. 
 60. See Review and Outlook, supra note 38. 
 61. In late 1997, a top-level national financial conference was held in Bei-
jing in response to the rapidly unfolding Asian financial crisis.  See Sense of 
Urgency, supra note 40. 
 62. See LARDY, supra note 22, at 197–98.  
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in 1998, when the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) issued RMB270 
billion (USD33 billion) of bank restructuring bonds to recapital-
ize the big four, boosting their capital adequacy ratios to the 
internationally accepted level of 8%.63   
However, with little change in the incentive structure at both 
the state banks and the SOEs, bank loan quality continued to 
decline and the big four’s capital once again evaporated.64  Con-
sequently, the top priority of China’s financial reform agenda 
was to promptly resolve the NPL problem.  In 1999, the Chinese 
government created four asset management corporations (one 
for each of the big four),65 taking a page from the U.S. experi-
ence a decade earlier after the savings and loans crisis.66  The 
AMCs purchased at book value from the big four at total of 
RMB1.3 trillion (USD169 billion) NPLs extended before the end 
of 1995.67  To finance this purchase, MOF issued RMB10 billion 
(USD1.2 billion) of 10-year bonds for each of the four AMCs, 
and PBoC also provided cash credit.68  This massive transfer of 
NPLs from the big four’s balance sheets to that of the AMCs 
effectively provided a second round of recapitalization for the 
big four.69   
  
 63. See Review and Outlook, supra note 38.  See also, Jun Ma, Financial 
Liberalization: Slow and Steady, 28 CHINA BUS. REV. 1216 (May 1, 2001), 
available at 2001 WL 13260974. 
 64. See Review and Outlook, supra note 38.   
 65. These AMCs are Huarong Asset Management Company for ICBC, 
China Xinda Asset Management Company for CCB, China Great Wall Asset 
Management Company for ABC, and China Orient Asset Management Com-
pany for BOC.  See BIS  WORKING PAPER, supra note 37, at 1. 
 66. China modeled its AMCs along the lines of the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration (RTC) created in 1989 by the United States government.  See supra 
note 157 and accompanying text.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 4. 
 69. The final cost to the Chinese government of the eventual write-offs plus 
the interest payments on the bonds could easily reach RMB 1 trillion 
(USD121 billion).  Fitch IBCA, in their 2000 Sovereign Debt Rating Report, 
estimated that the worst-case scenario based on systemic NPLs of 40% and a 
30% recovery rate would suggest a one-off charge equal to 20–25% of 1999 
GDP.  This scenario would raise the public debt-to-GDP ratio to 40–50%, 
roughly on par with Thailand, while higher interest payments could widen the 
budget deficient by an estimated 1–2% of GDP.  Such a huge burden, which 
may still be substantially understated, would without doubt considerably 
strain the government’s fiscal resources, even though the majority of the costs 
will not need to be realized until the AMC bonds are redeemed at maturity in 
10 years.  ERNST & YOUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 18. 
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The Financial Asset Management Company Regulation 
(“AMC Regulation”) promulgated in November 2000 by the 
State Council, the executive branch of the central government, 
subjects the AMCs to the concurrent supervision of the PBoC, 
MOF, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(“CSRC”).70  The AMC Regulation delegates the AMCs with an 
ultimate task of recovering the transferred bad loans to the 
fullest extent.71 
Major disposition options granted by the government to the 
AMCs include debt-to-equity swaps (“DESs”), loan resale, and 
debt restructuring.72  Besides domestic sales, DESs have been 
one of the most significant actions taken by the AMCs to resolve 
bad loans.  By the end of 2000, the four AMCs purchased 
RMB1, 488 billion (USD483.8 billion) of NPLs and completed 
587 swaps.73  DES deals completed by the AMCs, however, have 
received much criticism.74 The DESs were conducted based on 
the assumption that relieving the SOEs from the burden of debt 
servicing would improve their financial positions because many 
of them were highly overleveraged.75 It was hoped that through 
swaps the SOEs could eventually make public equity offerings 
to pay back the creditors turned shareholders, the AMCs, with 
their newly raised capitals.  While this strategy may be effec-
tive in cases where the companies were financially distressed 
but potentially viable, there is a real danger that in many other 
cases the debt embedded SOEs may turn the DESs into a shell 
game of debt forgiveness.76  Experts have pointed out that a 
change in SOE capital structure would not by itself improve the 
  
 70. Financial Asset Management Company Regulation, art. 4 (Nov. 20, 
2000), available at http://www.chamc.com.cn/English/index.asp. 
 71. Id. art. 3. 
 72. Id. art. 10. 
 73. Huarong has bought RMB505.6 billions (USD61.1 billion) NPLs, and 
completed 333 debt-for-equity swaps, Xinda RMB370 billion (USD44.7 bil-
lion), 168 swaps, Orient RMB266.5 billion (USD32.2 billion), 65 swaps, and 
Great Wall RMB345.8 billion (USD41.8 billion), 21 swaps.  Nicholas Howson, 
The AMCs’ Debt-for-equity Swaps: Opportunity for Foreign Capital?, 28 CHINA 
BUS. REV. 56 (2001). 
 74. See, e.g., id; Review and Outlook, supra note 38; Fred Hu, China’s 
Banking Reform: Pitfalls Ahead, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1999, at J8, 
available at 1999WL-WSJA 30190857 [hereinafter Pitfalls Ahead]. 
 75. The SOE average debt-to equity ratio is estimated to be in excess of 
400% by some measures.   See id. 
 76. Id. 
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managers’ behavior or put the ailing companies on sound foot-
ing.  Given the lack of meaningful means for the AMCs to en-
force their shareholder rights, delinquent SOE borrowers have 
a strong incentive to abuse DESs to evade debts, further con-
taminating the already weak credit culture in China’s state sec-
tor economy.77   
The AMCs have also used portfolio sale to recover NPLs.  Un-
til recently, the AMCs made only a few sale transactions to do-
mestic buyers.78  Late in 2001, Huarong Asset Management 
Corporation (“Huarong”), the largest of the four AMCs in China, 
nailed down a landmark auction sale with two groups of major 
international investment banks.79  This first international NPL 
sale in the country80 was hailed by financial analysts as “a 
breakthrough for the management of distressed assets in 
China.”81  A year later, near the end of 2002, Huarong finally 
won approval of the deal by China’s relevant financial authori-
ties, including the PBoC, MOF and MOFTEC.82  The foreign 
  
 77. Id.  
 78. ERNST AND YOUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 18.   
 79. The AMCs purchased NPLs from the big four at the loans’ face value, 
perhaps reflecting the Chinese government’s hesitation to recognize the low 
recoverability of the NPLs.  Outside observers pointed out that this no dis-
count transfer cast a serious cloud over the valuation of any further asset 
transfer by the AMCs to investors, because few buyers would purchase the 
NPLs at anything close to the face value, with no discount given the assets’ 
real value.  Edward S. Steinfeld, Free Lunch or Last Supper? China’s Debt-
Equity Swaps In Context, 27 CHINA BUS. REV. 2227 (2000).  
 80. China Completes Initial NPL Sale, BUS. WORLD , Dec. 13, 2001, avail-
able at LEXIS News. 
 81. James Kynge, Consortium Agrees Deal Over Chinese NPLs, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2001, at 31, available at LEXIS News.  
 82. Foreign Capital Allowed To Handle Non-Performing Assets in China, 
ASIA PULSE, Dec. 3, 2003, available at LEXIS News [hereinafter Foreign Capi-
tal Allowed].  
With the green light from regulators, two joint ventures are planned to be 
launched in economic development zones in Beijing or Shanghai. The First 
United AMC, founded by Huarong and a Morgan Stanley-led investment 
banking group will be responsible for resolving four packages of NPLs 
amounting to RMB10.8 billion (or USD1.30 billion), which covers problem 
loans in 254 companies in 18 provinces.  The Rongsheng AMC will be 
launched by Huarong and Goldman Sachs and in charge of a package of 
RMB1.97 billion NPLs (or USD238.2 million) made to 44 enterprises in 13 
provinces.  Huarong AMC Teams With Foreign Giants to Dispose of NPLs, 
BUS. DAILY UPDATE, Dec. 10, 2002, available at LEXIS News [hereinafter 
Teams with Foreign Giants]. 
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partners, 83 who paid nine cents on the dollar to Huarong,84 are 
able to take controlling stakes.85  According to a profit sharing 
plan, the income received by the partners from the follow-up 
disposals will differ at various stages.  If recovery goes ex-
tremely well, Huarong could recoup as high as 21% of the port-
folio’s face value.86  Significantly, this deal tested the Chinese 
government’s willingness to comply with the international 
valuation practice, as there was a longtime concern within the 
government that selling NPLs at a large discount to foreigners 
amounted to stripping state assets.87  The official approval of 
this transaction evidenced that “pragmatism on pricing the 
debts ha[d] won the day.”88  As outside observers hoped, with 
more international exposure, China’s NPL market would be-
come better regulated and more transparent.89  In addition, in-
coming foreign participants would also bring to China their 
proven techniques of distressed debt resolution, such as asset 
securitization discussed below. 
III. OVERVIEW OF ASSET SECURITIZATION    
Subpart A reviews the background of asset securitization.  
Subpart B then compares the benefits of securitization with its 
costs.  
A. Background of Securitization 
Securitization is a financial innovation that transforms illiq-
uid income-generating assets into securities with a second mar-
  
 83. Four of the five blocks of NPLs were bought by a consortium including 
Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Salomon Smith Barney and KTH Invest-
ments, Goldman Sachs bid for another block.  Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Restall, supra note 52.  In line with international practice, two 
disposal service firms will also be established to deal with the NPL disposal on 
behalf of the two joint ventures.  The business scope of the two ventures in-
cludes NPL management, transfer, exchange, sale and restructuring, as well 
as debt collection, but no DESs, or direct investment services and other finan-
cial services, such as lending or deposits and settlement, are permitted.  
Teams with Foreign Giants, supra note 82.  
 87. Kynge, supra note 81. 
 88. Restall, surpra note 52. 
 89. Foreign Capital Allowed, supra note 82.  
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ket.90  In a typical securitization transaction, an originator com-
pany effects a “true sale” of its rights in receivables or other 
financial assets to a special purpose vehicle, which then issues 
securities backed by the transferred assets.91  Investors in the 
capital markets then purchase these securities at prices based 
on the ABSs’ credit rating.92  The SPV uses the ABS issuance 
proceeds to pay for the financial assets.93  Sometimes mecha-
nisms of credit enhancement such as letters of credit, third 
party guarantees, or over-colleteralization are employed to pro-
vide investors with additional protections against the risk of 
default payment.94  In many cases, the originator also acts as 
servicer for the underlying assets, given its collecting exper-
tise.95 
Securitization first appeared in the 1970s, when the U.S. gov-
ernment took the initiative to develop a secondary market for 
residential mortgage loans.96  Over the next three decades, the 
scope of securitization greatly expanded to encompass a wide 
range of assets, including student loans, credit card loans, 
automobile loans, airplane leases, commercial and recreational 
equipment leases and loans, health care receivables, music roy-
alty receivables, and non-performing loans.97  According to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, securitization has 
  
 90. Joseph Shenker & Anthony Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, 
Current Issues and New Frontiers , 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1371–74 (1991). 
 91. A true sale is a complete divestiture of ownership — the transferor no 
longer retains any right, title or interest in the property.  It is intended to 
have the effect of removing the assets transferred from the transferor’s estate 
under section 541 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  Therefore, an important fea-
ture of an SPV is its bankruptcy-remoteness.  The Comm. on Bankr. and 
Corp. Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Struc-
tured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS . LAW . 527, 541 [hereinafter Structured 
Financing Techniques].  To gain a general understanding of true sale and the 
related issue of bankruptcy remoteness, see SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , 
supra note 7, Chs. 3 & 4.  
 92. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 7, at 136 (describing securitization as a 
process whereby a company uses an SPV to “raise[] funds by issuing securi-
ties, — usually debt or debt-like securities — and [then uses] the receivables 
purchased the originator to repay investors in the future”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See GIDDY , supra note 12, at 2.  
 96. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1-7 to 1-8. 
 97. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 539.   
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become “one of the dominant means of capital formation in the 
United States.”98  
B.  Benefits and Costs of Securitization 
Some commentators view securitization as a sort of “alchemy” 
that benefits both the investors and originator.99  For investors, 
securitization provides an opportunity to invest in diversified 
portfolio while undertaking a comparably low risk thanks to 
credit enhancements.100  Furthermore, the transaction structure 
can be flexibly designed to accommodate the needs of investors 
with different or unique investment preferences.101 
  Reducing financing costs constitutes one of the primary bene-
fits for an originator.102  In a securitization transaction, the in-
terest rate paid to the ABS investors is less than that paid in a 
straight debt issuance or equity offering by the originator.103 
This is possible because the return that ABS investors demand 
in a given deal is a function of only the credit rating of the secu-
rities backed by transferred assets.104  As a result, the origina-
tor’s creditworthiness is not a concern to the ABS investors.105  
A high ABS credit rating can thus be achieved because of the 
SPV’s isolated credit risk, as well as a careful structural design 
  
 98. Investment Company Act Release No. 19,105, [1992 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992).  
 99. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1-2.  Schwarcz ar-
gued that securitization is not a zero-sum game, in the sense that the origina-
tor’s benefits do not merely offset another person’s loss.  He believed that se-
curitization creates a genuine cost reduction for all parties.  See id. at App. A: 
Is Securitization A Zero-Sum Game?  See also , Frederick Feldkamp, Asset 
Securitization, The Alchemist’s Dream, in SECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000 1 
(supplement to INT ’L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 2000); Shenker & Colletta, supra note 
90; Howard Felson, Closing the Book on Jusen: An Account of the Bad Loan 
Crisis and a Chapter for Securitization in Japan, 47 DUKE L. J. 567, 587 
(1997). 
 100. See GIDDY , supra note 12, at 2–3. 
 101. Id. at 3–4. 
 102. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 530–31.   
 103. SHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–9. 
 104. Id. The most accepted rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s Rating 
Group (“S&P”) and Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”).  Another well-
known agency is Fitch, Inc.  For a general discussion on rating in securitiza-
tion, see section 8:9 of SCHWARCZ , STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7.  See also  
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency 
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV 1 (2002) [hereinafter Rating Agency Paradox].  
 105. Id.  
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and credit enhancements.106  Accordingly, an originator who is 
unrated or rated below investment grade can nonetheless 
through an SPV issue ABSs with an investment grade rating.107  
Even for an originator that itself has an investment grade rat-
ing, cost savings may be achieved in securitization if the SPV 
can issue ABSs with an even higher rating.   
Another advantage is that the originator can attract broader 
range of investors through a flexible transactional structure.108  
A creative deal designer may effectively utilize over-
collateralization, revolving asset pools, or subordinated inter-
ests to reconstructed ABS cash flows and maturity feature, in 
order to cater to both risk averse and risk seeking investors.109  
The resultant wider market reach may then transform into 
higher demand for and better liquidity of the ABSs.110   
Securitization transactions, however, incur substantial 
transaction costs.  There are, for example, costly fees payable to 
the credit rating agencies, attorneys, investment bankers, and 
accountants.111  Credit enhancement fees, annual reporting and 
printing fees also add to the long list of expenses.112  Accord-
ingly, some commentators argue that unless funds raised in a 
transaction exceed USD50 million, the benefits can hardly jus-
tify the extremely high transaction costs.113   
In general, an originator will need to weigh potential cost sav-
ings against the transaction costs before launching a securitiza-
tion transaction.114  In other words, a company contemplating 
securitization should compare the expected differential between 
interest payable on alternative funding options and that on 
ABSs issued by an applicable SPV, with the expected difference 
in transaction costs between the alternative financing.115  
  
 106. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 533–34. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 531.  
 109. Id.  
 110. The availability of funds in developed markets is usually not as limited 
as in the private markets, and certain issues presented in the private mar-
kets, such as lending limits of a particular financing institution, do not exist 
in the capital markets. Id. 
 111. See Felson, supra note 99, at 589. 
 112. Id. at 599. 
 113. Id. at 587. 
 114. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–11. 
 115. Id.  
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IV. SECURITIZATION OF DISTRESSED LOANS 
Subpart A discusses the desirability of distressed loan securi-
tization from both the originator and investors’ perspectives.  
Subpart B then considers four factors important to the feasibil-
ity of distressed loan securitization.  Subpart C studies the RTC 
securitization program. 
A.  Desirability of Distressed Loan securitization 
Generally, the business of securitizing distressed loans116 be-
comes more attractive when lending banks see a rise in corpo-
rate defaults within their portfolios, and therefore the banks 
become concerned with their financial performances negatively 
affected by the increasing number of problematic loans.117  From 
the viewpoint of financial institutions, the usual suppliers of 
securities backed by distressed loans, securitization limits their 
exposure to further losses to the extent of any guarantee or 
credit enhancement they provide to the transaction.118 At the 
same time, the risks and rewards of the underlying problem 
loans are transferred to and spread among market partici-
pants.119   
From the investors’ perspective, securities backed by dis-
tressed loans can provide profitable investment opportunities as 
long as the capital returns exceed the undertaken risks.120 In a 
distressed loan securitization transaction, investors expect that 
either the asset pool or the recoveries from loan collateral can 
  
 116. A loan is deemed distressed when the borrower’s financial ability to 
honor its payment obligation comes into question.  Common indicators of a 
borrower’s financial difficulty include a breach of financial covenants, a pay-
ment or technical default of other debt obligations, or a trading value for their 
debt significantly below other debts with similar coupon and maturity fea-
tures.  Not all distressed debts are in default.  The distressed debt of an issuer 
may be current on its bank loan obligations, but in technical or financial de-
fault on its other subordinated debt.  However, in this situation, there is sub-
stantial near-term risk that the borrower will eventually default on its loan 
obligations.  See Henry Albulescu et al., Distressed Debts CDOs Spinning 
Straw into Gold, S&P (May 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com > “fixed income” > “credit ratings criteria” 
[hereinafter [S&P Criteria].   
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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provide sufficient value to compensate their investment.121 To 
attract investors with different risk appetites, an originator 
may structure the transaction in a way that the same asset pool 
to generate several classes of notes with hierarchical seniority 
and different credit ratings.122  
In determining the proper interest rates payable to investors, 
the ABS credit ratings assigned by credit rating agencies are 
crucial.  These agencies serve the public investors’ information 
needs by inquiring and analyzing the key features of a securiti-
zation transaction.123   For example, Standard & Poor’s consid-
ers a number of factors in rating a distressed loan securitization 
transaction originated by a financial institution: (1) quantita-
tive and qualitative characteristics of the obligor’s credit wor-
thiness; (2) recoveries; (3) quantification of liquidity needs; (4) 
cash flow defaults and recoveries; (5) structural considerations; 
(8) collateral manager capability; and (7) legal analysis. 124 
B.  Feasibility of Distressed Loan Securitization 
At the heart of securitization is that asset pools must be able 
to generate reasonably predictable cash flows to pay ABS inves-
tors interest and principal.125  Four factors are specifically im-
portant in determining the securitizability of distressed loans: 
(1) the nature of the obligors; (2) the recovery rates of the dis-
tressed loans; (3) the quality of the originator-servicer; and (4) 
the availability of liquidity facility and credit enhancement.  
First, whether distressed loans are suitable for securitization 
heavily depends on the nature of loan obligors.126  As commen-
tators point out, the primary threats to steady ABS cash flows 
are the risks of obligors’ slow payment or no payment.127 To off-
set these risks, the asset pool created should satisfy three re-
quirements:  (1) the loan portfolio must consist of a sufficiently 
  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Rating Agency Paradox, supra note 105, at 10.  
 124. S & P Criteria, supra note 116, at “Overview of Standard USD Poor’s 
Methodology.” 
 125. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-1. 
 126. Id. at 1-1 
 127. The slow-payment risk is that the obligor on the loans may delay in 
making their payments, thus creating liquidity problem for the SPV.  The no-
pay risk is that the obligators may default in making their payments.  Id. at 2-
2. 
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large number of obligors in order to allow a statistical determi-
nation of the default risk;128 (2) the loan concentration ratios 
should be sufficiently low in order to avoid the possibility that 
default by a relatively small number of obligors disproportion-
ately harms the overall portfolio performance;129 (3) ideally, the 
loans have homogeneous contractual terms, delinquency and 
loss experience in order to minimize the costs incurred in ob-
taining and analyzing information on the portfolio.  If these cri-
teria are met, it is possible to employ an actuarial analysis on 
expected losses, uniform underwriting standards and servicing 
procedures that are satisfactory to rating agencies and inves-
tors.130  These three requirements explain why the paradigmatic 
securitizable assets are mortgage loans, auto loans, or bank 
credit card receivables.  When a specific asset pool fails to meet 
all of the requirements, success of the transaction will require 
using credit enhancements to mitigate the risks.131   
Second, recovery records serve as a crucial performance vari-
able in distressed loan securitization.132  By definition, dis-
tressed loans already have high delinquency and default risks.  
In securitization of such assets, therefore, the recovery ratio 
becomes a more meaningful consideration than default risk.133  
Recoveries may come from refinancing, restructuring or liquida-
tion.134   As long as recoveries produce a cash flow with relative 
predictability, the securities backed by distressed loans can also 
receive high credit rating, which may be further improved 
through credit enhancement.  Factors relevant to such recover-
ies include the characteristics of coupons, collateral type, and 
origination date. 135 For example, if the loan is collateralized by 
assets with high liquidity value, such as tradable securities or 
real property at a good location, then the recovery ratio is likely 
to be high.    
  
 128. Id. 
 129. This term refers to a situation where a relatively small number of the 
obligors account for a disproportionately large amount of loan portfolios.  Id. 
at 2-2 to 2-3. 
 130. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 90, at 1377.   
 131. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-2. 
 132. S & P Criteria, supra note 116, at “Recoveries.” 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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Third, the originator-servicer (usually a financial institution) 
plays a key role in a distressed loan securitization.136 After all, 
the originator is the entity responsible for creating the asset 
pool from a suitable portfolio.137  In addition, investors also rely 
heavily on the originator to channel the cash flow generated 
from the asset pool to the SPV for interest distribution.138 Fur-
thermore, the originator often assumes the servicer’s role given 
its experience and skills in collecting debts and enforcing credi-
tor’s rights.  In the event of loan defaults, the originator should 
take the best course of action to maximize recoveries for the 
investors’ benefit.139  In servicing securities backed by dis-
tressed loans, the originator’s main task is not one of selecting 
and monitoring loans that are expected to be performing.140  
Rather, the focus is on choosing weak loans with good recovery 
prospects and on actively working with the defaulted borrowers, 
the lending group, bankruptcy courts, and any other parties in 
order to generate the necessary cash flow to service the re-
quired ABS payments.141 To increase its ability to better service 
the asset pool(s), the originator may also transfers a part of ser-
vicing function to a reliable outside specialist.142 
Finally, liquidity facility and credit enhancement mecha-
nisms are often necessary to meet cash shortfalls and to raise 
ABS credit rating to a desirable level.  One great liquidity need 
stems from significant loan defaults and/or restructurings.143  
Defaults usually result in an immediate cessation of the bor-
rowers’ promised loan payments.144  In addition, restructuring 
and bankruptcy by one obligor may cause a write-down or ex-
tension of an original loan contract in order to alleviate the 
debtor’s financial burden.145  When any of these events happen, 
it becomes less certain when obligors’ repayments under loan 
  
 136. Felson, supra note 99, at 603. 
 137. S &P Criteria, supra note 116. 
 138. Felson, supra note 99, at 603. 
 139. S &P Criteria, supra note 116. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Felson, supra note 99, at 604. 
 143. S&P Criteria, supra note 116. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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contracts can be collected to service the ABSs.146 Other than the 
liquidity problems caused by obligors, there are also cash needs 
to pay periodic transactional fees,147 such as fees for servicer, 
trustee, accountants, legal experts and financial advisors.148  
Given the magnitude of liquidity problems in distressed loan 
securitization, therefore, it is necessary to create significant 
reserve accounts filling cash shortfalls. 149   
Credit enhancement mechanisms are also necessary to miti-
gate the problem of low repayment predictability and to raise 
the credit ratings of securities backed by distressed loans.150  
External credit enhancement can take different forms, such as 
a guaranty or surety bond, a bank letter of credit, an irrevoca-
ble credit line, or cash collateral account.151 There are two com-
mon types of internal credit enhancement used in distressed 
loan securitization.  One is over-collateralization, which means 
the anticipated cash flow from the underlying assets exceeds 
the scheduled principal and interest payments.152 This ar-
rangement helps to assure that a sufficient cash cushion exists 
to meet repayment obligations.  The second one is senior-
subordinate structure,153 in which sophisticated investors will-
ing to take a high level of risk would purchase subordinated 
securities, effectively providing another assurance for the SPV’s 
senior securities bought by average investors.154 
C.  The RTC Securitization Program 
The first securitization of non-performing loans in the U.S. 
history was the “N” series program by the Resolution Trust 
  
 146. Id. Additional liquidity problems can arise with revolving loans.  When 
distressed revolving bank loans are sold to the SPV, both the right to receiv-
ing borrower payments and the obligation to fund borrower draws are trans-
ferred to securitization. However, the terms of most revolving facilities loan 
allow the lenders to suspend borrower draws if there is any significant dete-
rioration or material change in the borrower’s financial condition. Therefore, 
the corresponding liquidity needs may be less of a concern.  Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-16 to 2-17. 
 152. GIDDY, supra note 12, at 11.  
 153. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-17 to 2-18. 
 154. The interest rate on these subordinated securities would be higher 
than that on the senior securities to compensate for the greater risk.  Id. 
File: CAO Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on: 3/24/2003 7:12 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:27 AM 
2003] ASSET SECURITIZATION FOR CHINA 587 
Corporation (“RTC”) in the early to mid 1990s.155  Congress cre-
ated RTC as a major effort to manage and resolve the assets of 
failed savings and loan associations.156 In its six years of exis-
tence, the RTC resolved 747 insolvent thrifts and recovered 
USD395 billion of the USD456 billion in its charge.157  Heralded 
by observers as an outstanding success, the RTC employed 
many innovative strategies to promptly dispose of portfolios 
under its mandate.158  The options RTC used varied depending 
on the quality and nature of the assets involved.  High liquid 
assets, such as government securities, single-family mortgage-
backed bonds, and high-yield bonds were disposed of without 
much difficulty in the well-developed secondary markets.159  For 
lower quality assets such as non-performing mortgages, the 
RTC employed three major techniques: bulk sales, auctions, and 
mortgage securitization.160  
The RTC’s securitization model for mortgage-backed securi-
ties presented several features.  First, the RTC issued securities 
in registered offerings.161  The disclosure requirements of regis-
  
 155. See Jack Rodman, Asia’s Budding Revival, 60 MORTGAGE BANKING 
3640 (2000). 
 156. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501, 103 Stat. 183, 184 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 157. See Dean Foust, The RTC’s Epitaph: It Worked, BUS. WK., Jan. 15, 
1996, at 29; Alvin K. Lim, The S&L Crisis Revisited: Exporting An American 
Model to Resolve Thailand’s Banking Problems, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
343, 355–56 (1998). 
 158. See Foust, supra note 157.  The RTC achieved impressive perform-
ances, evidencing by the fact that the taxpayers’ burden for the clean-up was 
only under USD145 billion, much less than many experts had predicted, the 
agency also received various critics.  See Lim, supra note 157, at 355–56.  
However, it was charged with mismanagement, including the excessive use of 
expensive consultants as well as outright fraudulent billing by contractors, as 
well as hastily unloading its assets at bargain prices to the benefit of wealthy 
investors and detriment of taxpayers.  See id.  Nevertheless, “the general con-
sensus is that the RTC was a rare example of a government agency that oper-
ated efficiently and effectively.”  Id.  
 159. See Lim, supra note 157, at 357. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 359.  The RTC initially filed a USD4 billion shelf registration 
with the SEC in May 1991 to securitize single and multi-family mortgage 
loans.  It subsequently filed more registrations to accommodate additional 
transactions in single and multi family loans, as well as commercial mortgage 
loans.  See also Kenneth J. Bacon, Director of RTC Office of Securitization, 
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tration allowed investors to access material information regard-
ing the underlying mortgages’ risks, thus increasing public in-
terest in the issuance and resulting liquidity of the securities.162 
In addition, the assets underlying the securities were typically 
held in trusts, which further reassured investors that the asset 
pools would be under unitary management.163  Furthermore, 
credit enhancements, such as reserve funds, were used to ob-
tain sufficiently high investment ratings in order to entice insti-
tutional investors.164  Finally, to handle non-residential com-
mercial mortgages in the pool that became non-performing, a 
“special servicer” was established to review the cases and take 
all necessary measures to minimize losses. 165  
Under the N-series program created specifically for securiti-
zation of sub- and non-performing mortgage loans, the RTC re-
quired interested commercial mortgage bankers to align with 
equity investors to purchase about half of any loan portfolio, 
while the RTC retained the remaining portion as a passive 
partner.166  The first deal of N series, N-1, closed in December 
1992.167  This deal acquired USD350 million in book value of 
non- and sub-performing loans from the RTC.168  The RTC, as a 
partner in the fund, leveraged the portfolio with USD110 mil-
lion of debt raised by Lehman Brothers, and then sold a 50% 
equity interest in the remaining cash flows to Bankers Trust 
and Soros Realty for an undisclosed sum.169  The RTC’s NPL 
securitizaiton program was successful partially because the 
agency worked closely with the private sector in market devel-
opment.170  Usually, private institutional investors participated 
  
Securitization at the RTC, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 4, avail-
able at LEXIS News. 
 162. See Lim, supra note 157, at 359.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. Reserve fund levels were approximately four to seven times the 
expected losses on the total amount of assets the RTC securitized.  The re-
serve funds were held by a trust and funded from bond proceeds.  Bacon, su-
pra note 161. 
 165. See Lim, supra note 157, at 360. 
 166. Commercial MBs Can Service RTC CRE, NAT ’L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
March 1, 1993, at 13, available at LEXIS News.  
 167. Marlene Givant Star, RTC Courts Pension Fund Assets, PENSIONS &  
INVESTMENTS , March 22, 1993, at 35, available at LEXIS News. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Bacon, supra note 161.  
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in the transactions in teams composed of asset managers, dis-
tressed loan servicers, and underwriters.  These teams could 
then capitalize on their expertise in NPLs and structured fi-
nance, and make use of their access to capital markets.  
V. SECURITIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA 
This Part examines the securitization experience of Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan, with an emphasis on their legal and regula-
tory development facilitating local market securitization.  
As a sophisticated financial innovation, securitization has 
witnessed phenomenal successes in the U.S. and United King-
dom.  This phenomenon perhaps surprises no one as these two 
countries enjoy the benefits that come along with a flexible 
common law system and highly developed financial markets.  
While many other countries also seek to develop similar pro-
grams in their own markets,171 they come to realize the neces-
sity and importance of establishing not only supportive capital 
markets but also adequate legal and regulatory infrastruc-
tures.172  
To many Asian countries, their civil code systems present ob-
stacles for carrying out securitization comprehensively.  One 
commentator remarks on this difficulty: 
[T]raditional asset securitization structures cannot simply be 
“parachuted” into individual financial systems (especially 
those of emerging market economies with a civil law tradition) 
and expected to fulfill the sorts of functions for which they are 
so useful in the United States and the United Kingdom.173  
  
 171. For example, France and Spain have successfully completed securitiza-
tion transactions, Germany and Italy have passed legislation to promote secu-
ritization.  See generally, ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE (Theodor 
Baums & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1996).  
 172. See Douglas Arner, Emerging Market Economies And Government 
Promotion of Securitization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’L L. 505, 506 (2002) (out-
lining for an emerging economy the requisite capital market and legal factors 
necessary for mortgage securitization).  
 173. Arner listed the following purposes that securitization may serve in the 
developed financial markets of the U.S. and U.K.: (1) supporting public policy 
objectives such as broad home ownership and the development of financial 
markets (especially capital and mortgage markets); (2) addressing regulatory 
requirements for financial institutions, especially capital adequacy and lend-
ing limit requirements applicable to banks; (3) transferring risk, especially in 
the context of non-performing assets and portfolio diversification; and (4) pro-
viding finance.  See id. at 505.  In addition, Feldkamp argued that properly 
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Nonetheless, undertaking an asset securitization transaction 
in any given jurisdiction serves as a useful “stress test” of the 
limits in that specific jurisdiction, especially in respect to legal 
impediments.174 
Although the inflexibility of civil legal systems makes it diffi-
cult to accommodate various securitization structures,175  East 
Asia’s great need for new capitals, especially after the financial 
crisis of late 1990s, has spurred exportation of this financial 
technology into the region.176  With governmental support, sev-
eral Asian economies have actively modified their individual 
legal and regulatory frameworks by implementing new legisla-
tion.177   
Japan is the first Asian country that experimented with secu-
ritization.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several Japanese 
government charged committees and organizations started to 
explore this financial tool. 178  In 1993, the Japanese Diet (the 
parliament) enacted the Law Regarding Regulation of the Busi-
ness Concerning Specified Claims (“Specified Claims Law”), 
which permitted limited securitization of leases and credit card 
claims.179  This legislation provided the impetus for the first se-
curitizations backed by assets, such as auto loans and indus-
trial and computer lease receivables.180  In 1995, the Ministry of 
Finance proposed a liberalization of the financial markets to 
permit financial institutions and certain credit corporations to 
issue ABSs through domestic special purpose corporations.181  
The Japanese “Big Bang” initiated in 1996 set prompt resolu-
  
implemented securitization could prevent or cure “liquidity traps,” the “ulti-
mate bad consequence of flawed economic and financial management policies” 
in the U.S.  See Feldkamp, supra note 99, at 1. 
 174. Arner, supra note 173, at 506. 
 175. Kevin T.S. Kong, Prospects For Asset Securitization Within China’s 
Legal Framework: the Two-Tiered Model, 32 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 237, 244 
(1998). 
 176. Id. 
 177. For example, Indonesia enacted the Mortgage on Land and Land-
Related Objects Law to facilitate secured lending based on land assets.  Thai-
land introduced implementing legislation to create insolvency and trustee 
laws similar to the U.S. legal structure.  Id. 
 178. Felson, supra note 99, at 591.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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tion of the NPLs as a top priority for banking liberalization.182  
In a landmark transaction of 1999, Morgan Stanley Dean Wit-
ter sold the first securities backed by Japanese NPLs on a mix 
consisting of office, retail and apartment buildings.183 
The Japanese legal and regulatory framework relevant to se-
curitization went through considerable changes in the 1990s.184  
The developments in four legal areas are most significant.  
First, the burdensome perfection procedure imposed by the 
Japanese Civil Code185 was streamlined through the passage of 
so called MITI Securitization Law of 1993186 and more signifi-
cantly the 1998 Perfection law.187  Under the new perfection 
system, assignments of large numbers of financial assets can be 
perfected easily through a one-time filing.188  Second, the Law 
  
 182. Id. 
 183. Rodman, supra note 155. 
 184. For a discussion on the legal obstacles to securitization that Japan 
faced before the major framework modification was completed, see Hideki 
Kanda, Securitization in Japan, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’L L. 359 (1998) (identi-
fying three major obstacles: first, the compliance with the perfection require-
ments in connection with an asset transfer was costly and cumbersome; sec-
ond, Japanese corporate law made it expensive to set up a special purpose 
entity; third, the regulatory structure of securities was complex and inflexible 
due to the long history of jurisdictional struggles among ministries involved). 
 185. Under the article 467 of Japanese Civil Code, to perfect the assignment 
of a contractual right, including receivables with respect to interested third 
parties, the assignor must either deliver proper notice or obtain necessary 
consent.  In either case, the assignor is required to ensure that the relevant 
documents bear officially certified dates.  See Masaru Ono, Unique Aspects of 
Japanese Securitization Relating To The Assignment of Financial Assets, 12 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 469, 472 (2002). See also, Yoshiki Shimada & Shinji 
Itoh, Japanese Asset Securitization: A Guide For Practitioners, 38 HARV. INT ’L 
L. J. 171, 179–180 (1997). 
 186. TOKUTEI SAIKENTO NI KAKARU JIGYO NO KISEI NI KANSURU HORITSU [Law 
concerning the restrictions of business relating to specified claims, etc.], Law 
No. 77 of 1992.  This law is commonly named after its main sponsor, the Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”).  This law covers only spe-
cific types of financial assets, mainly auto loans and lease receivables.  It is 
less often used since the passage of the Perfection Law. 
 187. SAIKEN JOTO NO TAIKO YOKEN NI KANSURU MINPO NO TOKUREITO NI  
KANSURU HORITSU [Law prescribing exceptions, etc., to the civil cod require-
ments for setting up against a third party to an assignment of claims], Law 
No. 104 of 1998.  This law has a broader coverage.  It allows general compa-
nies to perfect the assignment of monetary claims in relation to third parties 
through filing a simple electronic registration with the Legal Affairs Office of 
the Japanese government.  See Ono, supra note 184, at 472. 
 188. Id. 
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Concerning the Securitization of Specified Assets by Special 
Purpose Companies (“SPC law”) was passed and subsequently 
amended to reduce the cost of the establishment and operation 
of special purpose vehicles.189  Third, in 1998, Japan amended 
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law to facilitate 
cross-border transactions.  The amended law eliminated licens-
ing and prior notification requirements previously imposed on 
any transfer of receivables between Japanese residents and for-
eigners.190  Finally, Japan enacted a new “servicer” statute to 
allow corporations to engage in the business of servicing NPLs 
originated by financial institutions.191  This enactment has in-
vited major foreign players to establish special -purpose corpora-
tions to service NPLs, providing comfort among the interna-
tional investors interested in acquiring such assets in Japan.192   
Securitization also made substantial inroads in other East 
Asian countries in the late 1990s when the region was strug-
gling with the aftermath of a major economic and financial 
breakdown.  In Korea, before the Act on Asset-backed Securiti-
zation (“Korean ABS Act”) was enacted in 1998, securitization 
was difficult, if not impossible.193  The Korean ABS Act became 
the cornerstone of the rapidly developing securitization in Ko-
rea.194  A major purpose of this act was to improve the sound-
ness of financial institutions.195  This act greatly facilitated Ko-
  
 189. The SPC law became effective on September 1, 1998 and was amended 
in 2000.  Among other things, the amendment reduced the SPC’s minimum 
capital, registration and license tax and the real property acquisition tax.  The 
new law also broadened the scope of specific assets that may be securitized by 
an SPC to include general proprietary rights, in addition to loans extended by 
financial institutions, nominative monetary credits, real estate and beneficial 
interest of the trust holding such assets.  See Japan: Amendment to Promote 
Securitization, 19 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 48 (2000). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Yoshiki Shimad & Togo Dowaki, Japan, in 17 INT’L FI N. L. REV. 40 
(1998).  
 192. Rodman, supra note 155.  
 193. Sean Bulmer & Hyoung Don Kim, Korea, in SECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 
2000 28 (supplement to INT’L. FIN. L. REV., Oct. 2000). 
 194. Id. 
 195. The Act on Asset Backed Securitization, art.1 [hereinafter Korean ABS 
Act]. 
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rea’s NPL resolution and contributed to the successful restruc-
turing of the country’s financial system.196  
The Korean ABS Act provides for the establishment of a 
bankruptcy-remote special purpose company (“SPC”)197 and the 
appointment of a qualified service provider to manage the as-
sets.198  It also sets forth certain conditions, which if satisfied 
assure a transfer of assets to be a true sale rather than a se-
cured financing.199  The Act further requires registration of a 
securitization plan, which contains certain information regard-
ing the transferred assets, originator and securities issued.200  
The registration of assets transfer can be accomplished through 
a filing with the Financial Supervisory Committee.201  In addi-
tion, securitization enjoys certain tax benefits, including a 50 
percent reduction in capital gains taxes for the sale of real 
properties by the SPC, and an exemption of registration and 
acquisition taxes on real properties acquired by the SPC within 
a certain period of time.202 
The Korea Asset Management Corporation (“Kamco”), a gov-
ernment NPL resolution agency,203 has achieved impressive per-
  
 196. South Korea emerged as the star performer among the Asian econo-
mies in financial reform.  It leads the way of restoring banking industry to 
health.  Asian Banking 2000 Review, supra note 26, at 45. 
 197. Korean ABS Act, ch. 3. 
 198. Id. art. 11. 
 199. Id. art. 13.  It is rather special that this act details the specifics of true 
sale instead of leaving it to the discretion of the courts.  See Jong-Goo Yi, 
Trends and Issues in Securitization in Korea, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 2425 (Apr. 1 
2001), available at 2001 WL 15390492. 
 200. Korean ABS Act, arts. 3–4. 
 201. On completion of the transfer registration, the transfer of receivables 
will be deemed to have been perfected against third parties, which obviates 
the need to complete the normal perfection steps such as sending of notices 
with a fixed date stamp.  If receivables are secured by mortgages, on registra-
tion of transfer of receivables with the FSC, the mortgages are deemed to have 
been transferred to the SPC. Therefore, the normal steps to register the trans-
fer of mortgages with the relevant real property registration office are not 
necessary. Id, arts. 6–8. 
 202. See Yi, supra note 199. 
 203. Kamco is the only institution in Korea charged with this mandate. This 
mission is stated under the government Act on the Efficient Disposal of Bad 
Assets of Financial Institutions.  Currently, 38% of Kamco’s shares are di-
rectly owned by the Korean government, another 31% indirectly owned by the 
government through the Korea Development Bank, and the rest is owned by 
24 Korean financial institutions.  Of the NPLs acquired by Kamco, 63.19% 
were from commercial banks, 24.81% from investment trust companies, 7.97% 
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formance in utilizing securitization to resolve NPLs.  From 1999 
to 2001, Kamco successfully securitized USD5.9 billion of NPLs 
acquired from financial institutions.204  Kamco made its first 
domestic public offering of NPL backed securities worth 
USD271 in June 1999.205  Samsung Securities and Huyndai Se-
curities bought the bonds and auctioned them off to local inves-
tors.206  Kamco’s first international NPL securitzation was 
accomplished in July 2000.207  A dual SPV structure 
accomplished this transaction.208  A Korean SPV sold a senior 
note backed by a NPL portfolio denominated in U.S. dollars and 
Japanese yen to a Cayman SPV.209  Two credit enhancements 
were used for the Korean senior note: subordinated notes and 
irrevocable credit facility that the Korean Development Bank 
provided.210  The Cayman SPV then issued USD367,000,000 
floating rate notes due in 2009, secured by the issuer’s interest 
in the Korean SPV senior note.211  The Cayman SPV senior 
notes were rated at BBB and Baa2 by Fitch and Moody’s 
respectively, and listed on the Luxemburg Stock Exchange.212  
The notes were then offered to qualified institutional buyers in 
the U.S. pursuant to Rule 144(a).213 
Taiwan passed its Financial Assets Securitization Statute in 
2002.214  Modeled on the Japanese civil law approach, this legis-
lation provides for Special Purpose Trusts (“SPTs”) to securitize 
assets and issue beneficiary certificates backed by those as-
  
from insurance companies and 3.61% from merchant banks.  See FQA, at 
http://www.kamco.or.kr/eng/faq/faq1.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003). 
 204. New Tack Eyed for Collection Agency, NIKKEI WEEKLY (July 9, 2001), 
available at LEXIS News.  
 205. Kamco “MIRAE” Bond 99-1, at http://www.kamco.or.kr/eng/area/mirae/ 
mirea99-1.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Kamco “MIRAE” Bond 
99-1].  
 206. Id. 
 207. Sean Bulmer & Hyoung Don Kim, Kamco NPL Securitization, in 
SECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000 28, 29 (supplement to INT ’L FI N. L.  REV. 
(2000)) [hereinafter Kamco NPL Securitization]. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Karen Richardson, Taiwan’s Tough Stance on Banks Lures Investors , 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2002, at C14. 
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sets.215  It also sets out the types of financial assets that may be 
securitized.216  The act permits financial institutions to pool 
home mortgages, credit-card receivables, or corporate loans — 
including non-performing loans — and then issue new debts 
backed by these assets.217  In addition, borrowing the U.S. con-
cept of “Ginnie Mae,” the act allows Taiwanese government and 
financial institutions to establish a fund to promote securitiza-
tion and guarantee creditworthiness.218  Significantly, financial 
analysts view this legislation as a major component of Taiwan’s 
comprehensive program to clean up its NPL laden banking in-
dustry.219  Experience in several other Asian countries, includ-
ing Thailand and the Philippines,220 also demonstrated that 
during the time of financial turmoil, there tended to be a great 
demand for the restructuring of financial institutions with a 
large volume of non-performing assets. 221  Notably, the need to 
resolve NPLs, a prevalent problem in the region, served as a 
catalyst for securitization in East Asia. 
VI.  NPL SECURITIZATION IN CHINA: THE MARKET CONDITIONS 
When acceded to the WTO in December 2001, China under-
took to open its entire financial sector to foreign competition 
after five years.  As time quickly goes by, the Chinese govern-
ment sees the increasing exigency of overhauling its insolvent 
banking system.  Promptly disposing of the daunting NPLs, 
therefore, tops China’s financial restructuring agenda.  Because 
of the U.S. and other Asian countries’ successful experience, 
securitization began to attract attention in China as an alterna-
tive NPL resolution.  The PBoC, a major Chinese financial regu-
  
 215. Qi Lin International Law Offices, Securitization Law Nears Passage 
(Sept. 2001), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/qilin_cm_0901.pdf. 
 216. Taiwan’ NPL ratio is estimated to range from 6.5 to 15% of all loans.  
Neil Campbell et al., Securitisation Comes to Taiwan (Oct. 2001)¸ available at 
http:// www.securitization.net/pdf/qilin_sectai_1001.pdf. 
 217. Richardson, supra note 214.  
 218. Qi Lin, supra note 215.  
 219. Id.  See also Campbell, supra note 216. 
 220. Richardson, supra note 214.  
 221. See Yi, supra note 199.  In fact, Japan has recently realized that it has 
been slow in securitizing the distressed loans taken over by the Resolution 
and Collection Corporation, and that it should learn from the successful ex-
perience of the Korea Asset Management Corporation. New Tack Eyed for 
Collection Agency, NIKKEI WEEKLY, July 9, 2001, available at LEXIS News. 
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lator, has indicated its support for such an experiment.222  Fi-
nancial institutions, especially the AMCs mandated with NPL 
disposition, have been actively exploring this new option.223  
A.  Supply of NPL Securitization 
The supply of NPL securitization in China can be understood 
from the four feasibility factors identified in Part IV.224  The 
first factor affecting asset pool creation is the nature of obligors. 
Ideally, the underlying portfolio should feature with a statisti-
cally large number of obligors, low loan concentration ratios, 
and standardized or similar loan contractual terms.225  In real-
ity, however, the Chinese state banks have extended four fifths 
of their lending to SOEs, particularly favoring a targeted group 
consisting of the biggest ones, which the government deemed as 
pillars of the state sector.226  Furthermore, because bank lend-
ing oftentimes provided the main source of working capitals for 
SOEs, loan agreements varied in their terms, depending upon 
the borrowers’ business and financial conditions.227  Unfortu-
nately, a large number of SOEs do not generate enough operat-
ing revenues even before interest expenses were paid.228  Many 
of them have no viable prospect of becoming profitable.  They 
have not been liquidated due to the governmental concern that 
  
 222. During the “China Development Summit Forum” held on March 25, 
2001 in Beijing, Dai Xianglong, governor the Chinese Central Bank PBoC, 
stated that China would study the successful experiences of international 
asset management companies and experiment assets securitization as a way 
to dispose of NPLs.  Dai also emphasized the possibility of using securitization 
as a means to introduce international capital and expertise into Chinese 
banking sector.  See Zhengquanhua: Huajie Buliang Zichan de Youxiao Tu-
jing (Securitization: An Effective Approach of Resolving NPLs), JINRONG 
LILUN YU SHIJIAN (FI N. THEORIES AND PRAC.) (Beijing, 2001). 
 223. Our analysis of the NPL securitization market below focuses on the 
portfolios transferred from the state banks to the AMCs for the reason that 
the AMCs are specifically set up by the government to deal with NPL resolu-
tion.  Major references are made to the practices of Huarong, one of the big-
gest and most adventuring AMCs in China.  
 224. See infra Part IV. 
 225. See infra footnotes 126–154 and accompanying text. 
 226. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 11.   
 227. See Dan Huang, Woguo Tuixing Zichan Zhengquanhua de Zhang’ai 
Fenxi (An analysis on the Obstacles to Asset Securitization in China) at 1 (on 
file with the author). 
 228. See Pitfalls Ahead, supra note 74. 
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an aggressive reform plan would produce vast social implica-
tions and even unrest.229   
The foregoing analysis of the first factor establishes that a 
vast majority of NPLs under the Chinese AMCs management is 
not suitable for securitization.  However, it is not true that 
NPLs securitization is completely impossible.  An inquiry under 
the second factor, i.e. the recovery ratios, shows that among the 
massive portfolios of Chinese NPLs, three groups of NPLs seem 
to be potentially securitizable.   
The first group is the non-performing commercial mortgages 
extended in the mid 1990s during economic overheating.230  This 
type of NPL, although accounting for only a small percentage of 
the overall Chinese NPLs, is still sizable in absolute dollar 
amounts.231  Recovering certain portion of such NPLs’ value is 
viable given the rapid economic growth seen in the major Chi-
nese cities, the locations of many the real estate projects in-
volved in NPLs.232   
In addition, non-performing corporate loans secured by land 
use rights or other real estate collateral are also potential secu-
ritization assets.  However, cash flow generated through fore-
closure and liquidation of NPL collateral must be reasonably 
predictable to support the ABS repayments.233  This would rest 
on the enforceability of the AMCs’ creditor rights and a func-
tioning liquidation market. 234 However, China’s current condi-
tions with respect to both factors are yet to be further improved. 
The last group of securitizable NPLs originates from loans 
rendered to SOEs with whom the AMCs are able to work out 
  
 229. See Corporate/Debt Restructuring: Japan, The Hong Kong SAR & The 
People’s Republic of China: A Roundtable Discussion, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L.  
REV. 1, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion].  See generally, LARDY, 
supra note 22, ch. 2 (The State-Owned Enterprise Problem).  
 230. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 231. Interview with Xiaobo Wang, General Manager of Huarong Research 
Department, in Beijing, China, (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with 
Wang]. No published statistics on this category of NPLs are currently avail-
able.   
 232. Cf. Felson, supra note 99, at 609 (arguing that jusen (Japanese con-
sumer mortgage loans) securitization could provide investors with a profitable 
opportunity when the real estate appreciates as a result of development pro-
grams and an overall growth in the Japanese economy).  
 233. See Xiaobo Wang, Buliang Zichan Ye Keyi Zhengquanhua (Non-
Performing Loans Can Also be Securitized) (on file with the author). 
 234. Interview with Wang, supra note 231.  
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reliable repayment schedules.  In fact, Kamco, the Korean coun-
terpart of the Chinese AMCs, has successfully securitized cer-
tain distressed corporate loans transferred from financial insti-
tutions.235 Significantly, Kamco securitized only “restructured 
corporate loans,” i.e. loans that have obtained court approvals of 
restructuring as part of corporate re-organization or composi-
tion proceeding regardless of security existence.236  The borrow-
ers were private companies considered operationally viable with 
only temporary liquidity problems.237  The asset pools, there-
fore, could generate predictable repayments based on court 
sanctioned restructuring schedules.238  Among the Chinese 
AMCs’ debtor SOEs, there exist a certain number of companies 
that have viable business prospect but incurred excessive debts.  
These companies are potentially able to pay off a portion, but 
not the whole, of their bank loans.239  Effective debt restructur-
ing with these SOE debtors, therefore, would recover a fraction 
of the NPL book value.240  In fact, the Chinese government has 
provided the AMCs with an authority to partially forgive cer-
tain SOEs’ debts and then work out the balance in new pay-
ment schedules.241  For example, among Huarong’s NPL recov-
eries, over 80% were accomplished through debt restructuring, 
with less than 20% stemming from liquidation.242  To support 
securitization, however, the repayment stream under debt re-
structuring must be reasonably predictable.  Absent the court 
  
 235. See Kamco “MIRAE” Bond 99-1, supra note 205.  
 236. Therefore, when Kamco initially purchased these loans, the original 
lenders were not entitled to declare default or execute their claims through 
the foreclosure.  This was due to the current and existing repayments of the 
loans according to the rescheduled payment schedules.  Thus, in valuing the 
restructured loans, more emphasis has been given to the credit standing of the 
borrowers.  Id.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. In addition, when purchasing the NPLs from the Korean commer-
cial banks Kamco retains a put option, which allows Kacmo to sell back the 
NPLs to the relevant banks on the occurrence of certain events such as pay-
ment default continuing for six months.  Id. 
 239. Kaisheng Yang, Restructuring and Disposing of China’s Financial Non-
Performing Assets — A New Investment Trend in China, Address at Asia 
Society’s Conference “Investing in China’s Financial Market” (May, 2002) (on 
file with the author) [hereinafter Yang Speech]. 
 240. Id. 
 241. The banks are however not permitted to reach such partial debt for-
giveness agreements with their SOE debtors.  Id. 
 242. Id.  
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sanction and monitoring that were available to Kamco, the Chi-
nese AMCs will have to rely on the not very effective non-
judicial methods to enforce their restructured payment plans.  
The foregoing discussion indicates that the Chinese AMCs 
may create asset pools consisting of certain securitizable 
NPLs.243  In order to understand the technical aspects of securi-
tization one must also consider the third and fourth feasibility 
elements. 
The quality of servicer cannot be overestimated.  To make a 
NPL securitization plan work, the originator-servicer, which in 
this note’s analysis would be one of the Chinese AMCs, must 
recover predictable cash flows either by actively working with 
the obligors, or by liquidating foreclosed loan collateral.  The 
AMCs can be expected to well perform the originator-servicer 
functions given their full resolution power and expertise in debt 
collection and workout. In addition, the AMCs can further en-
hance their capability through strategic alliance with experi-
enced international counterparts.244  
The success of NPL securitization also requires the availabil-
ity of liquidity arrangements and credit enhancements.  Given 
the low predictability of NPL repayment cash flows and sub-
stantial liquidity risks, significant reserve accounts are usually 
indispensable to fill the cash shortfalls.245  Furthermore, credit 
enhancements are also necessary in order to provide structural 
protection.  In the case of Chinese NPL securitization, to raise 
the ABS credit rating to above investment grade, it is desirable 
  
 243. Huarong seems to have completed its design of a pilot asset backed 
securitization scheme and the establishment of asset pools.  It has submitted 
this plan to relevant financial regulators.  CHINA HUARONG ASSET 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, OVERVIEW 2001, at 15 (on file with author).  In 
fact, Huarong’s first international NPL auction provides a good example of 
portfolio selection for the purpose of structuring a particular transaction.  
About 60% of the assets underlying the sold NPLs are in SOEs, with the re-
mainder to commercial property, industrial parks, hotels, residential pre-
cincts, and a free trade zone.  See Kynge, supra note 87. 
 244. For example, on April 26, 2001, Huarong entered with Kamco a memo-
randum inviting the latter to work as its advisor in securitization, and to as-
sist Huarong select portfolios and design securities structure.  Huarong In-
vites Foreign Advisor for Asset-Based Securitization, XIN HUA, April 26, 2001, 
available at LEXIS News. 
 245. Wang, supra note 233, at 3 . 
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for the AMCs to provide guarantees and to use sen-
ior/subordinated structures.246   
B.  Demands for NPL Securitization  
The demand for NPLs securitization cannot be analyzed 
without first understanding the general conditions of China’s 
capital markets.  Although the markets have achieved remark-
able growth, they still have a long way to go before reaching a 
more mature stage.  The following discussion highlights a few 
prominent market features.   
First, expansions in primary equity market and that of pri-
mary debt market are not balanced, with the former far out-
stripping the latter.  China’s debt market mainly consists of 
treasury bonds.247  In 1987, the Ministry of Finance issued the 
nation’s first treasury bonds, and by 1998 total Treasury issues 
rose to about USD80 billion.248  This increase resulted from the 
Chinese government’s growing reliance on treasury issues to 
finance its fiscal deficits.249   In contrast, the equity market has 
experienced a much more dramatic growth.  China did not have 
a stock market until 1990, but now more than 1,200 stocks are 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, with a 
market capitalization of around USD500 billion, second in Asia 
only to Japan.250  In addition, Chinese companies make up 35% 
of Hong Kong’s stock market capitalization, against only 7% in 
1995.251  
In addition, the secondary market activities are significantly 
speculative.  Price/earning ratios in China’s stock market are 
not supported by fundamentals.252  Individual investors, rather 
than institutional investors, dominate the nation’s stock mar-
  
 246. Id. 
 247. Bob Yau-Ching Chan, The Mortgage-Backed Securities Market in the 
People’s Republic of China, in MORTGAGE -BACKED SECURITIES MARKET IN ASIA 
68–74 (1999), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Mortgage_ 
Backed_Securities_Markets.  
 248. ERNST & YOUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 35. 
 249. See Chan, supra note 247, at 247 
 250. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 10.   
 251. Id.  
 252. Chan, supra note 247, at 68. 
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ket.253  These investors trade frequently on rumors, causing 
high market volatility.254  In the secondary bond market institu-
tional investors are the main players.  They trade in large vol-
umes but usually concentrate on a particular issue, and there-
fore making prices quite volatile.255  
Furthermore, the access to capital markets is highly regu-
lated.  Under the current Company Law companies eligible for 
entering domestic bond market are only those which have gen-
erate profits in the past three consecutive years and where the 
average profits generated by such companies during such three-
year period are enough to repay the companies’ one year inter-
est on the bonds to be issued. 256  In fact, the PBoC approved few 
corporate bonds were approved in recent years.257  Similarly, 
new share listings on the stock market are subject to tight re-
strictions by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.  The 
CSRC has been functioning as the “country’s chief allocator of 
equity market,” giving favor almost exclusively to SOEs.258  
Finally, China’s capital markets are still largely closed to for-
eign investors.  Until very recently, the only onshore market 
available to foreigners was the foreign currency denominated B-
share market, which is very small in capitalization (about 3% of 
that of the RMB denominated A-share market), and thinly 
traded.259  With China’s WTO admission, rules restricting for-
eign investment in domestic markets are being gradually eased.  
A major progress in market open-up was achieved in the end of 
year 2002, when the CSRC and PBoC jointly promulgated a 
new regulation allowing “qualified foreign institutional inves-
  
 253. There are about 66 million individual investors in the Chinese stock 
market, with 100-odd brokers, and 15 fund-management companies serving 
them.  Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 10.  
 254. Chan, supra note 247, at 68.   
 255. Id. 
 256. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSI FA (Company Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China) art. 159, translated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM'N 
OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT ’L PEOPLE ’S CONGRESS, THE LAWS OF THE 
PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 269–318 (1995). 
 257. Chan, supra note 247, at 69. 
 258. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 11.  S&P counts thiry-five “private” 
listed companies in China, but points out that local governments and even the 
military are in fact in control of a good number of them.  Id. 
 259. See Ma, supra note 63. 
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tors” (“QFIIs”) to invest in domestic equity and bond markets.260  
This partial market liberalization offers new opportunities for 
foreign investors to tap China’s ever-growing domestic markets.  
However, due to the strict curbs on the amount of money QFIIs 
may invest and the length of time they can take the money out 
of China, so far only a handful of foreign financial institutions 
have expressed interest in apply for a QFII license.261  
The foregoing overview of China’s current capital markets 
demonstrates that much remains to be done to increase both 
market breadth and depth.  Because of the novelty and com-
plexity of securitization itself and the exotic nature of NPL se-
curitization, there is a general lack of knowledge about the se-
curitization concept and relevant principles.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising to expect that the demand for NPL backed securities 
will be very limited.  The participants in this market are likely 
to be confined to institutional investors, which in the domestic 
markets currently include commercial banks, insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, and fund management companies.262  How-
ever, even the demand of these domestic institutional investors 
will be relatively small due to the few numbers of institutional 
players and their capital constraints. 263 In addition, many of 
these institutional investors are currently subject to strict limi-
tations on their investment scope and can only invest in low-
risk instruments, such as treasury bonds.264  Another possibility 
of demand for the Chinese NPLs comes from outside of the 
country.  Recently, some major international investors have 
exhibited a rising interest in the Asian NPL market.265 These 
large global players have been quite successful in countries 
such as Japan, Korea and Thailand.266  They now seem to be 
willing to shift part of their investment in the budding Chinese 
  
 260. Provisional Measures on the Administration of Qualified Foreign Insti-
tutional Investors Investing in Domestic Securities (promulgated by CSRC & 
PBoC, Nov. 5, 2002), available at http://www.isinolaw.com. 
 261. See China Limits Program on Foreign Investment, ASIAN WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 2, 2002, at M2. 
 262. See Huang, supra note 227, at 2.  
 263. Id. 
 264. See China State Banks to Receive Extra Help On Bad Loans, CHINA 
DAILY, May 2, 1999, available at LEXIS News. 
 265. See Richardson, supra note 214.   
 266. Id. 
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NPL market.267  However, as discussed below, international in-
vestors still hesitate to allot large amounts of money in the 
Chinese NPL market, mainly due to their concern with coun-
try’s unsophisticated and opaque regulatory regime. 
VII.  NPL SECURITIZATION IN CHINA: LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
This Part first outlines the existing legal  and regulatory 
framework relevant to securitization, including laws governing 
the areas of company, trust, contract, secured transaction, and 
bankruptcy.  It then identifies the current legal obstacles or 
legislative gaps impeding NPL securitization.  In addition, this 
Part suggests enactment of special legislation to facilitate secu-
ritization.  
China’s legal system does not specifically provide for asset se-
curitization as a financial technique.  However, Chinese compa-
nies have already successfully completed a few international 
securitization transactions, which involved mainly future re-
ceivable cash flows of infrastructure projects268 as well as future 
shipping receivables.269  The following discussion outlines the 
legal framework within which a securitization transaction may 
be structured.  
  
 267. See China Seeks Foreign Capital To Help Manage Domestic NPAs, ASIA 
PULSE, Jan. 2, 2003, available at LEXIS news (pointing out that regardless of 
their sizes, international funds begin to see a big potential for profits in 
China’s NPL market).  In addition to Huarong’s recently approved interna-
tional auction, China Construction Bank is also seeking governmental ap-
proval to form a joint venture with Morgan Stanley to resolve bad assets with 
a book value of about USD483 million.  China Bank Seeks Aid Abroad, ASIAN 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10–12, 2003, at M3.  
 268. For example, in August 1996, Zhuhai Express Way Company, acting as 
both originator and issuer, successfully completed a USD200 million bond 
offering.  The bond placement was secured by fees the Zhuhai municipal gov-
ernment collected from toll roads, bridges, and tunnels, as well annual vehicle 
registration fees.  See Banks See ABS As New Finance Tool, CHINA DAILY, 
March 3, 1998, at 6.  
 269. In April 1997, China Ocean Shipping Company, a state-owned shipping 
company, successfully securitied its future shipping revenues from its U.S. 
and European business.  Kong, supra note 175, at 240. 
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A.  Establishment of Domestic SPVs 
Currently, Chinese law does not allow the establishment of a 
special purpose corporation used in securitization transactions 
of many other jurisdictions. The law presently permits Chinese 
companies only to conduct their businesses within the scope 
approved by the State Administration of Industry and Com-
merce (“SAIC”). 270  This strict ultra vires restriction raises diffi-
culties in establishing an SPC within China.271  Given that 
SPC’s purchase and sale of receivables are likely to be deemed 
as financial services, SAIC will unlikely to issue a business li-
cense to an SPC, which usually has thin capital. 272  
However, the 2001 enactment of Trust Law  273 makes it possi-
ble to use a special purpose trust to carry out securitization.  
Although passing the Trust Law is a major legislative achieve-
ment, the “trust” concept is still new to China, as is to many 
other civil law countries.274  Therefore, it remains to be seen 
how the law will be applied and interpreted in the context of 
asset securitization.  For example, one issue would be whether 
the beneficiary certificates issued by SPTs are considered secu-
rities.275  
  
 270. See Jonathan Zhifeng Zhou, Launch of the Securitization Market in the 
PRC? Still a Long Way to Go, in SECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000 18 (supple-
ment to INT. FIN. L.  REV., Oct. 2000).  See also, Gao Peiji and Paul Kruger, 
China Faces Up to the New Challenges of Securitization, 19 INT’L FIN. L.  REV. 
29 (2000). 
 271. See Zhou, supra note 270.  
 272. Id. 
 273. ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO XINTUO FA (Trust Law of the People’s 
Republic of China), 9TH NAT’L PEOPLE ’S  CONG., 21ST SESS., STANDING COMM. 
(April 28, 2001), available at http://www.isinolaw.com.  The Trust Law became 
effective on October 1, 2001. 
 274. See Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New Developments in Struc-
tured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95, 128–129 (2000). [hereinafter New Develop-
ments]. 
 275. Currently, China’s Securities Law does not provide for ABS in the defi-
nition of securities.  Cf. Securitization Law Nears Passage, supra note 215 
(stating that under Taiwan’s Financial Assets Securitization Statute benefici-
ary certificates issued by SPTs are classified as securities unless the Ministry 
of Finance determines them to be short-term bills).  
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B.  Transfer of Receivables 
Articles 79 to 81 of the new Contract Law effective on October 
1, 1999 deal with transfer of receivables.276  Under the new law, 
a creditor may, subject to limited exceptions, assign its contrac-
tual rights to a third party by serving a notice to the debtor of 
such an assignment without first obtaining consent from the 
debtor.277  This legal allowance greatly facilitates a receivable 
transfer, which is a usual step in a securitization transaction.278  
Such assignment, however, must be approved or registered in 
accordance with any legal or regulatory relevant provisions if so 
required thereunder.279  This requirement is significant to 
prospective NPL securitization, in which transfer of state-
owned assets are most likely to be involved.  Since changes in 
ownership of state assets and valuations thus involved are 
subject to complicated regulatory regime, NPL securitization 
may very well require special approval by relevant agencies.280   
C.  Secured Credit Law 
China’s Security Law passed in 1995 recognizes five types of 
security: guarantee, mortgage, pledge, lien, and deposit.281  The 
law provides that buildings, land use rights, and movable prop-
erty such as machinery may be mortgaged.282 The law also con-
tains provisions on mortgage registration and foreclosure.283  
  
 276. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO HETONG FA (Contract Law of the Peo-
ple’s  Republic of China), arts. 79–81, translated in  LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 
COMM’N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT ’L PEOPLE ’S CONGRESS OF THE 
PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
1999 9-76 (2000) [hereinafter CONTRACT LAW]. 
 277. Id. art. 80.  However, simultaneously transferring both the contractual 
rights and obligations still requires the consent by the counter-party.  Id. art. 
88. 
 278. See Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 29–30; see also Zhou, supra note 
270, at 18. 
 279. CONTRACT LAW, art. 87.  See Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 30. 
 280. Id. at 30–31. 
 281. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO DANBAO FA (Security Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China) art. 2, 8TH NAT’L PEOPLE ’S CONG., 14TH SESS., STANDING 
COMM. (Oct. 1, 1995), reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PRAC. 21 (Aug. 
1995) [hereinafter SECURITY LAW].  See also Kong, supra note 175, at 255. 
 282. SECURITY LAW art. 34.  See also Jerome Cohen & John Lange, The Chi-
nese Legal System: A Primer For Investors, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
345, 370–71 (1997). 
 283. SECURITY LAW arts 38-44, 53-58. 
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However, the lack of procedures on registration and foreclosure 
means that there is no effective protection against subsequent 
purchasers’ claims absent notice of the security interest, and 
that no efficient means of executing against collateral exists in 
the event of a default on the underlying obligation.284 
Provision of foreign-related security is subject to the Foreign 
Security Procedures promulgated by PBoC,285 and Foreign Se-
curity Implementing Rules issued by Sate Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”).286  The Foreign Security Procedure 
recognizes only three forms of foreign-related security interest: 
guarantees, mortgages, and liens.287  Under the Foreign Secu-
rity Implementing Rules, any foreign-related security must ob-
tain SAFE’s prior approval.288  Assignments of foreign-related 
security rights would require prior consent of the security pro-
vider as well as SAFE approval.289   
D.  Bankruptcy Law 
Although Chinese bankruptcy law is fragmented290 and under 
review,291 general bankruptcy concepts are recognizable in the 
  
 284. Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 371. 
 285. Jingnei Jigou Duiwai Danbao Guanli Banfa [Administration of the 
Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions Inside 
China Procedures] (Sept. 25, 1996), reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & 
PRAC. 37 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter Foreign Security Procedure]. 
 286. Jingnei Jigou Duiuwai Danbao Guanli Banfa Shishi Xize [Administra-
tion of the Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions 
Inside China Procedures Implementing Rules] (Jan. 12, 1998), reprinted and 
translated in CHINA L. & PRAC. 22 (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter Foreign Security 
Implementing Rules]. 
 287. Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 285, art. 2. 
 288. Foreign Security Implementing Rules, supra note 286, art. 3. 
 289. See Kong, supra note 175, at 256.  
 290. On the national level, there is the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (for Trial Implementation), the Company 
Law, which includes some bankruptcy-related provisions applicable to limited 
liability companies and joint stock companies, and the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, which includes some bankruptcy-related provisions applicable to legal 
persons, including joint ventures and other foreign-invested enterprises. On 
the local level, there are some other regulations relating to bankruptcy and/or 
litigation.  See Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 372. 
 291. It is expected that the long awaited, comprehensive new bankruptcy 
law will be promulgated in the near future. Roundtable Discussion , supra note 
229, at 22. 
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existing regime.292  Under the various bankruptcy-related laws, 
a creditor has the right to petition for a debtor’s insolvency.293  
After the court’s declaration of bankruptcy, a liquidation com-
mittee created by the People’s court or a court has the power to 
invalidate transactions occurring six months prior to the date of 
the acceptance of bankruptcy proceedings by a Chinese court on 
certain grounds.294  Secured creditors have priority rights in the 
property of an insolvent debtor, preempting any competing 
claims of unsecured creditors to the same debtor’s assets.295 
If the debtor is an SOE, the bankruptcy petition is currently 
subject to prior approval of relevant authorities.296  There may 
be a two-year reorganization period initiated by authorities.297  
If the debtor still defaults on its debt payment upon expiration 
of reorganization, the  court shall declare the debtor bankrupt.298  
While creditors do have the ability to petition for the insolvency 
of SOEs, for both practical and policy reasons, SOE bankrupt-
cies have been allowed only on an experimental basis and in 
relatively limited numbers.299   
E.  Legislative Uncertainties  
While structuring a securitization transaction within the pre-
sent legal and regulatory framework is possible, significant 
gaps exist, presenting substantial uncertainties to the success 
of NPL securitization.  First, although the Chinese laws appear 
to recognize the concepts of perfection and priority,300 there is 
  
 292. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 33. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO QIYE POCHAN FA (SHIXING CAOAN) (Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implemen-
tation) (Dec. 2, 1986), translated in  LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM’N OF THE 
STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT’L PEOPLE ’S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA, THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 684–95 (1998). 
 297. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 33.   
 298. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 229, at 15.  
 299. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 371. 
 300. “Perfection” refers to protection of a transferee’s interest in transferred 
assets from creditors of the transferor and from the transferor’s trustee in 
bankruptcy.  In a securitization transaction, perfection means to protect the 
SPV’s interest in the transferred financial assets from claims of the origina-
tor’s creditors.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-
Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’L L. 235, 240 (1998).  In the U.S. arti-
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no clear guidance on how to accomplish a valid portfolio trans-
fer in securitization where usually numerous obligors are in-
volved.301  The Contract Law abolished the rule requiring a 
written agreement for a contract of any kind.302  The law is si-
lent, however, on whether notice of assignment to the debtor 
must be given in writing and when such notice may be deemed 
delivered to the obligors.303 
Second, Chinese laws have yet to address the issue of a true 
sale.304  Some uncertainty remains as to the treatment of re-
course and the enforcement of a transferee’s right.305  It is un-
clear, for example, how the determination of a true sale would 
be affected when a transaction employs certain credit enhance-
ment mechanisms, such as provision of a guarantee by the 
originator, or the existence of the originator’s right to any sur-
plus collections.   
Third, China’s existing legal system provides insufficient pro-
tection of creditors’ rights.  For example, the enforcement of 
  
cle 9 of U.C.C. provides that perfection is achieved by filing financing state-
ments in jurisdictions where the debtor (originator) or the collateral is located.  
  “Priority” refers to the ranking of multiple claims to the same asset.  In 
bankruptcy, it refers to “a creditor’s right to have a claim paid before other 
creditors of the same debtor receive payment.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1212 
(7th ed. 1999). Priority is ascertained by searching filing records to determine 
whether other parties have prior filings against the relevant collateral or as-
sets.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995).  
 301. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 33. 
 302. CONTRACT LAW, act 10.  
 303. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 30. 
 304. A key to a securitization transaction is to complete a true sale as op-
posed to secured financing.  See supra note 91. 
  Arguably, the issue of the SPV’s bankruptcy remoteness is less a rele-
vant concern if the originator is a state-owned Chinese financial institution, 
for example, an AMC, which is deemed usually unlikely to go bankrupt.  How-
ever, in 1999, the Chinese central government refused to rescue the insolvent 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (“GITIC”), which 
was the second largest of its kind in China and owned by the Guangdong pro-
vincial government.  See Lou, supra note 33, at n.18.  See also, Ben Branch & 
Fei Ji, Bankruptcy Practice in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan: A Summary, 
2002 ANN. SURV. OF BANK. LAW 341 (2002).  The GITIC’s bankruptcy raised 
foreign creditors’ concern with the increasing possibility of the bankruptcy of 
state owned financial entity as the government takes more sweeping financial 
cleanup.  See, e.g., Karby Leggett, China’s Credit Costs Go On Trial With 
GITIC, ASIAN WALL ST. J., March 29, 1999, at J3, available at 1999WL 
5430580. 
 305. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 32–33. 
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mortgage foreclosure is notoriously difficult.  In addition, 
China’s fragmented bankruptcy law does not provide an orderly 
framework for the reorganization and liquidation of insolvent 
enterprises.306  Furthermore, the judicial and administrative 
discretion involved in the decisions to commence a bankruptcy 
proceeding against an SOE debtor creates unpredictability in 
the enforcement of creditors’ rights.  Thus, the lack of experi-
ence in administrative proceedings further compounds the diffi-
culty.   
Additional uncertainties arise when foreign investors partici-
pate in China’s NPL resolution.  Recently, the Chinese govern-
ment issued two new regulations relevant to foreign investment 
in NPL market.307  Obviously, the government has recognized 
the importance of involving outside funds and expertise to re-
solve NPL issue as well as the closely related conundrum of 
SOE restructuring.  The multi-departmental regulatory regime 
and opaque approval procedure, however, make it very difficult 
to accomplish a transaction with foreign participation.  In addi-
tion, there are also restrictions on the kind of SPVs that foreign 
investors may set up to take over NPLs.308  Finally, foreign in-
vestors are concerned with China’s foreign exchange controls 
imposed on profit repatriation.309   
F.  Proposal for Special Legislation  
China currently does not have a comprehensive legal frame-
work for carrying out securitization.  Of course, given the mani-
fested governmental support, the AMCs may well be able to se-
curitize NPLs based on the existing laws and regulations. 310  
This approach, however, lacks certainty and predictability, as 
ad hoc interpretations of ambiguous provisions by various gov-
ernment agencies may result in regulatory conflicts.  Moreover, 
  
 306. Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 372. 
 307. Interim Rules on Financial Assets Management Companies’ Absorption 
of Foreign Funds for Assets Reorganization and Disposal (promulgated on 
Oct. 26, 2001 by MOFTEC, MOF, and PBoC); Provisional Rules on Reorgani-
zation of the State owned Enterprises by Using Foreign Fund (promulgated on 
Nov. 8, 2001 by the State Economic and Trade Commission, MOF, SAIC, and 
SAFE), available at http://www.isinolaw.com. 
 308. China Needs to Revise Laws, Provide More Transparency For NPL 
Sales, AFX-ASIA (Nov. 5, 2001), available at LEXIS News. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Interview with Yang, supra note 6.   
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validating every stage of a transaction would entail “a Byzan-
tine process of obtaining consents and approvals from a panoply 
of government bodies.”311  Thus, the AMCs may encounter sub-
stantial difficulty while experimenting with NPL securitization.   
Therefore, enacting special legislation is the preferable ap-
proach to resolving uncertainties and to paving the way for se-
curitization.  In modeling this new securitization law, China 
may borrow the asset securitization acts passed in Korea and 
Taiwan.  The new law could provide for securitization as a gen-
eral financial technique and give special accommodation for 
NPL transactions.   
In establishing a comprehensive regime for securitization, the 
proposed new law should fill the legislative gaps discussed ear-
lier.  For example, with respect to possible SPV structures, 
China may choose to follow the Korean approach, providing for 
both SPC and SPT, or the Taiwanese approach, which allows 
only the use of SPTs.  As for the true sale issue, China’s pro-
posed law may specifically define the relevant criteria as in the 
Korean legislation.  Alternatively, the proposed law may leave 
the issue open to the courts when disputes arise.  The first op-
tion suffers from inflexibility, while the second approach flaws 
with the unpredictability and may fail due to the current judi-
cial incompetence in China.  In addition, clear notice procedures 
should be set up for perfecting an asset transfer.  Notice should 
be deemed given where certified mail has been sent to the obli-
gor at the address appearing in the registration at the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce, or in absence of 
that, to the last known address.  If on at least two occasions the 
mails have returned undelivered, a public notice published in 
generally circulated newspapers should be deemed valid.  Fi-
nally, to encourage international participation, the proposed 
law should also provide for clear guidance on foreign-related 
issues, including, for example, setting up of a foreign-involved 
SPV, provision of foreign security, and repatriation of profits 
overseas.  
  
 311.  Balbir Bindra, Legal Initiatives to Promote Securitisation, available at  
http://www.vinodkothari.com/secchina.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). For 
example, Huarong’s first international NPL auction took a year to obtain ap-
provals from all relevant authorities.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION  
Resolving the mammoth NPLs burdening China’s fragile 
banking sector is certainly a long march.  Any procrastination 
in implementing NPL disposals, however, could ultimately lead 
to much greater fiscal burdens, due to the “ice cream effect.”312  
The Chinese government has realized the seriousness of the 
problem and has demonstrated considerable resolve in attack-
ing it.   
Securitization has been successfully utilized in the U.S., Ja-
pan, Korea, and many other countries as an option of NPL dis-
position.  The Chinese AMCs mandated with NPL resolution 
are currently exploring NPL securitization.  As this Note has 
suggested, however, the unique nature of Chinese NPLs, the 
underdevelopment of its capital markets, and the lack of com-
prehensive legal framework present substantial obstacles to a 
large-scale NPL securitization program in China.  While the 
bulk of Chinese NPLs are not suitable for securitization, this 
Note indicates that of the massive portfolio held by the AMCs 
certain loans are nonetheless securitizable.  The Chinese AMC 
may therefore embark on their pilot NPL securitization pro-
gram from this identified portion of NPLs.  Successful NPL se-
curitization would not only contribute to the ultimate resolution 
of China’s NPL issue, but would also assist the general devel-
opment of securitization in the local markets.   
To facilitate localization of this financial technique, the Chi-
nese government must address the existing market and legal 
obstacles.  This Note thus stresses that the government should 
further liberalize capital markets, allowing greater participa-
tion of both domestic and foreign institutional investors.  In ad-
dition, this Note proposes enacting special securitization legis-
lation to establish comprehensive and predictable legal infra-
structures.   
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